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Abstract 
Many developing countries are currently in the process of designing regulatory systems that should make it 
possible to use the potential of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for agricultural development, while at the 
same time managing the risks for food safety and the environment that are potentially associated with these 
technologies. In view of the considerable costs associated with biotechnology regulation and the scarcity of 
biosafety specialists, there are processes in various regions of the developing world to establish regional systems 
of biotechnology regulation. So far, there are major knowledge gaps as to how regional systems of biotechnology 
regulation can be designed to be effective and efficient and to fulfill principles of good governance, such as 
transparency, voice and accountability, control of corruption, and avoidance of special interest capture. There is a 
wide variety of possible regional approaches, which differ with regard to the level of centralization, the scope of a 
regional system, the types of regional institutions and processes, and the types of financing mechanisms. Based 
on the literature on environmental and fiscal federalism and transaction costs economics, the paper develops a 
conceptual framework for the assessment of regional systems of biotechnology regulation. The framework 
specifies design options and assessment criteria, and identifies major trade-offs as well as the factors affecting 
these trade-offs. The paper takes West Africa as an example to illustrate this framework and refers to the 
European Union for comparison. The paper concludes that involving regional experts, stakeholders and policy-
makers into debates on the design of a regional regulatory system is an important strategy to fill knowledge gaps 
and arrive at conclusions regarding the trade-offs involved in regional biotechnology regulation. 




Genetically modified (GM) crops offer a considerable 
potential for contributing to agricultural development. 
While the perceptions regarding the risks associated 
with this technology differ widely, there is agreement 
that the introduction of GM crops requires regulation. 
In fact, regulation is the primary policy instrument that 
societies use to manage the risks associated with this 
technology. The institutional design and the 
functioning of a regulatory system have far-reaching 
implications for the possibilities to make this 
technology available to farmers, to ensure 
environmental and food safety, and to create 
incentives for innovation. Whether or not the public 
will develop or maintain trust in biotechnology also 
depends to a large extent on the design and the 
functioning of the regulatory system. Therefore, 
biotechnology regulation is an important element of 
good governance in the agricultural sector. 
More than 120 countries, which are parties to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, currently participate 
in the “Development of National Biosafety 
Frameworks” project of the United Nations 
Environment Program and the Global Environmental 
Facility (UNEP-GEF). Eight countries have moved to 
the UNEP-GEF project on the “Implementation of 
National Biosafety Frameworks”. Concerns about the 
costs associated with biotechnology regulation and 
potential problems to control transboundary 
movements of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) across neighboring countries have led to a 
strong interest in the regional collaboration for 
biotechnology throughout the developing world (GEF, 
2006).  
In spite of the increasing interest in regional regulation 
worldwide, there is almost no literature on the question 
of which type of regional coordination would be 
desirable for biotechnology regulation, depending on 
the context-specific conditions of the region under 
consideration. Regional coordination can obviously 
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take different forms, ranging from an informal 
collaboration of neighboring countries and the 
harmonization of regulatory standards to the 
establishment of a regional regulatory system with a 
central regulatory authority. Which governance 
structures for a regional biotechnology regulation 
should countries develop? Which degree of 
centralization should they aim for? How should the 
institutions for regional biotechnology regulation look 
like? How independent from political decision-making 
bodies should they be? Which forms of public 
participation should they entail? How should a 
regional regulatory system be financed? And which 
factors influence the answers to these questions? 
The goal of this paper is to contribute to bridging the 
knowledge gap on regional biotechnology regulation 
by developing a conceptual framework that identifies 
key factors to be considered in designing a regional 
system. This framework is mainly based on two 
branches of literature: the theory of environmental and 
fiscal federalism (Oates, 2001; Oates, 2004), and the 
New Institutional Economics literature, especially the 
transaction cost approach developed by Williamson 
(1991). The paper also takes the classical institutional 
economics literature into account (Bromley, 2006).  
The region of West Africa is taken as an example to 
illustrate this framework. West Africa is an interesting 
case, as several initiatives are currently underway in 
this region to establish a regional system for 
biotechnology regulation. The countries that are 
members of West Africa’s Permanent Inter-State 
Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel 
(CILSS) have developed a Framework Convention for 
a Common Biosafety Regulation. The Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 
been collaborating with CILSS and with the West and 
Central African Council for Agricultural Research and 
Development (CORAF) to establish a regional system 
of biotechnology regulation in the wider ECOWAS 
region. The francophone countries that form the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WEAMU) 
also plan to establish a common regional system for 
biotechnology regulation. These examples are well 
suited to illustrate the design options and the potentials 
and challenges of regional biotechnology regulation. 
Empirical data on biotechnology regulation in West 
Africa were collected by a multidisciplinary team in 
the following countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, 
Togo and Senegal. The research was conducted 
between May and August, 2006. Approximately 130 
semi-structured interviews were held with stakeholders 
from ministries, research institutes, producer 
organizations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and the private sector. Documents collected 
in-country and additional secondary research was used 
to substantiate the interviews. For purpose of 
comparison and illustration, the paper also refers to the 
regional system of biotechnology regulation in the 
European Union, which is one of the few already 
existing supranational systems of biotechnology 
regulation worldwide. Information on biotechnology 
regulation in the EU is derived from secondary 
sources. 
By developing a conceptual framework based on 
economic theory, the paper aims at contributing to 
improved decision-making on the design of regional 
regulatory systems. The framework does not provide a 
blueprint for a regional system for biotechnology 
regulation in West Africa or elsewhere. It rather aims 
at identifying issues and options on which decisions 
have to be made when designing a regional regulatory 
system. The goal is to identify the factors and trade-
offs that political decision-makers may wish to 
consider in the process. The design of a regulatory 
system, at the national as well as at the regional level, 
necessarily involves value judgments, since regulation 
is at the heart of the societal debate on biotechnology. 
Hence, it is important that countries and regional 
communities make their own decisions, in line with 
the preferences of their societies, on the way in which 
they wish to regulate biotechnology. International 
agreements such as the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, regional treaties that the countries have 
signed, and emerging international standards for 
biotechnology regulation provide important frame 
conditions for making such decisions. Together with 
other disciplines, economic theory can provide insights 
for making decisions on regional regulatory design 
within these frame conditions, but research can only 
inform, not replace, the deliberations of policy-makers 
and society about the reasons they consider legitimate 
and justifiable in public policy decisions (Bromley, 
2006). 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly 
describes major initiatives for regional biotechnology 
regulation in West Africa and outlines the system in 
place in the European Union for the purpose of 
comparison. Section 3 presents the conceptual 
framework and Section 4 derives conclusions for the 
West African case.  Birner and Linacre 
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The Quest for Regional Biotechnology Regulation 
in West Africa 
Background 
The initiatives to establish regional systems for 
biotechnology regulation in West Africa are largely 
motivated by the potential that Bt cotton may have for 
increasing the competitiveness of cotton production in 
the region. West Africa is one of the major cotton 
producing regions in the world. In Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Côte D’Ivoire, which account for 80 % 
of cotton production in West Africa, cotton is a major 
revenue source for a large part of the rural population, 
and a major source of export earnings. In Burkina 
Faso, cotton exports account for more than half of all 
export earnings, in Benin for about one third and in 
Mali for one quarter (USDA, 2006). In view of strong 
international competition, a long-term decline in world 
market prices, and agronomic challenges, agricultural 
research institutions and policy-makers have 
developed an interest in introducing genetically 
modified cotton. In collaboration with Monsanto, 
Burkina Faso started field testing Bt cotton in 2003. 
Mali has expressed its interest to Monsanto and 
Syngenta to start field trials, and the Côte d’Ivoire 
Agricultural Research Institute has suggested that—
after restoring peace—the country would become a 
leader in biotechnology research in the region (USDA, 
2006). Among the West African countries, only 
Burkina Faso has, so far, passed a biosafety law and 
established a regulatory system that can process 
applications for field trials and commercial release. 
Most of the other countries have completed a 
Biosafety Framework with the assistance of UNEP-
GEF, and they are in the process of developing 
biosafety laws (Jaffe & Meissa Dieng, 2007). The 
introduction of biotechnology is politically contested 
throughout the region, which has delayed processes of 
passing biosafety legislation in other countries, 
especially those where civil society is strong, such as 
Mali and Senegal (Birner, Resnick, & Linacre, 2007).  
As indicated above, three efforts are currently 
underway to establish regional systems of 
biotechnology regulation in West Africa, led by 
CILSS, WEAMU and ECOWAS in collaboration with 
CORAF. Figure 1 displays shows which countries are 
members of these regional bodies. Several factors 
provide a rationale for the interest in regional 
approaches to biotechnology regulation:  
(1) Most of the major cotton-producing countries in 
West Africa are relatively small in terms of population 
size, and they belong to the poorest countries in the 
world. Hence, there is an expectation, especially 
among donor organizations, that there is a need to 
exploit economies of scale in a regional approach to 
biotechnology regulation.  
(2)  Major agro-ecological zones cut across West 
Africa, which contributes to economies of scale in risk 
assessment and risk management.  
(3) A regional approach would facilitate the cross-
boundary movement of genetically modified crops. 
This is important for West Africa’s landlocked 
countries, and for the efforts of WEAMU and 
ECOWAS to establish a common market in West 
Africa. (4) All countries in the region used the African 
Model Law as a basis for developing their biosafety 
frameworks and draft legislation, so that there are no 
major differences between countries regarding the type 
of regulatory systems they envisage establishing. 
CILSS Framework Convention on Biosafety 
Among the three regional biosafety initiatives, the 
CILSS initiative is currently the most advanced. 
CILSS was established in 1973 in response to the 
 
Figure 2: Membership of West and Central African 
countries in different regional bodies 
Source: Resnick (2006) 
drought and famine afflicting the region at that time. A 
Framework Convention Introducing a Common 
Biosafety Regulation for the Prevention of 
Biotechnological Risks in the CILSS Countries was Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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developed in a process of two years and adopted by 
the CILSS Council of Ministers in 2006. The CILSS 
countries still have to translate the Convention into 
national law, which is not expected to be completed 
before 2008. The Convention aims at harmonizing 
national biosafety regulation in the member states by 
specifying procedures, definitions, and responsibilities 
for the national authorities to be set up by the member 
states. Under the Convention, a Regional Consultative 
Committee will be established, which will provide 
general technical and policy support to the national 
authorities. The committee will comprise 
representatives of the member states including the 
national biosafety agencies and scientific experts as 
well as non-voting representatives of WAEMU and 
other relevant regional bodies. The committee can 
make authorization decisions for countries that have 
not yet set up a regulatory system and when products 
will be marketed throughout the region. Otherwise, 
authorization decisions remain the responsibility of the 
member states. The CILSS Biosafety Convention has 
some similarities with the CILSS Common Regulation 
for the Registration of Pesticides created in 1999, 
which established a regional process for the 
registration of pesticides. Under this convention, a 
company that wants to market a pesticide in any of the 
nine CILSS member countries needs to submit only 
one application to a committee of experts who 
undertake the risk assessment and make a decision for 
the all nine countries. 
Regional biosafety initiatives by ECOWAS and 
CORAF 
The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) encompasses the fifteen countries that 
comprise the entire West African region (Figure 1). 
The organization was founded in 1975 with four major 
objectives: to expand intra-community trade, improve 
physical infrastructure, reduce excessive external 
dependence, and creating a single ECOWAS currency. 
The institutional structure of ECOWAS includes a 
Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government, and a Parliament. The 
plan to elect the members of the Parliament directly is 
not yet implemented. Decisions made by ECOWAS 
need to be translated into national law to become 
effective. An important step for regional cooperation 
with regard to biosafety regulation at the ECOWAS 
level was a West Africa conference held in 
Ouagadougou in June 2004, where it was decided to 
create (1) a public information system on 
biotechnology for the region, (2) a partnership 
between West African and North American research 
institutes and (3) a West African Biotechnology 
Center. At a conference held in Abuja in November 
2004, attended by the West African Ministers of 
Science and Technology, it was decided that 
ECOWAS would take ownership of all initiatives in 
the region in the area of biotechnology. CILSS was 
designated as the coordinator for the implementation 
of the region’s bio-safety activities in view of CILSS’ 
activities regarding a regional convention, as outlined 
above. Since CORAF is considered to be a technical 
arm of ECOWAS, CORAF’s Biotechnology and Bio-
safety Program was adopted at the Abuja Meeting as 
the ECOWAS agenda for agricultural research and 
development activities concerning biotechnology and 
bio-safety.  
CORAF is a network of the national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) of 21 countries within the 
West and Central African regions. One of the main 
objectives of CORAF’s Biotechnology and Biosafety 
Program has been to demonstrate the potentials of 
biotechnology and to influence to political debate in 
favor of biotechnology. Another goal has been to 
augment the capacity of scientists to use biotechnology 
for agriculture.  With regards to the bio-safety 
component the program, the main objectives include 
creating commonalities in bio-safety procedures, 
strengthening institutional and human capacities in 
bio-safety implementation, establishing a regional 
regulatory framework, and sensitizing the public. 
Donor funding, especially by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), has 
played an important role in supporting the CILSS, 
CORAF and the ECOWAS Initiatives. 
The WEAMU Initiative to Establish a Regional 
Regulatory System 
The West African Monetary and Economic Union 
(WEAMU) emerged in 1994 through a revision of the 
treaty of the Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest, which was launched in 1973. WEAMU is 
formed by eight francophone West African countries 
(see Figure 1). The institutional structure of WEAMU 
comprises a Commission, the Council of Ministers, the 
Conference of Heads of States, and an 
Interparliamentary Committee. Unlike in the case of 
ECOWAS, WEAMU’s Council of Ministers has 
decision-making authority. WEAMU can pass 
legislation that becomes immediately effective in the Birner and Linacre 
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member states without having to be translated into 
national law. WAEMU’s trade liberalization scheme 
became effective in January 2000, resulting in the 
abolition of all tariffs on goods produced within the 
member states, the adoption of a common external 
tariff, and the standardization of business laws. 
WEAMU is currently in the process of establishing a 
regional regulatory system for biotechnology. 
WEAMU expects funding and technical support for 
establishing this system from the proposed GEF “West 
Africa Regional Biosafety Project,” which will be co-
funded by the World Bank and the International 
Development Association (IDA). The project aims to 
“(a) produce operational, regionally harmonized 
methodologies for risk assessment and management of 
LMOs and LMO products, including a regional 
manual of procedures; (b) strengthen national 
biosafety frameworks to enable their implementation; 
and (c) set up a regional legal framework for biosafety 
as well as strengthen policies on intellectual property 
rights pertaining to transgenic plants and establish a 
regional observatory to monitor possible 
environmental and health impacts and socioeconomic 
issues.” The design of the regional regulatory system 
is still under discussion. The initiative to establish a 
regional regulatory system with support from the 
World Bank has been criticized by African and 
international civil society organizations that oppose 
the introduction of Bt cotton in the region. In a News 
Release from 2006, they expressed concern that 
project would “promote favorable regulations in a few 
key countries” and then “use these regulations as a 
model that can be imposed on neighbouring countries 
by regional bodies” while side-stepping democratic 
debates (African Center for Biosafety, ECT Group, 
GRAIN, & RALLT, 2006).  
A Snapshot of the Regulatory Procedure for 
Biotechnology in the EU 
For the purpose of comparison, the regional regulatory 
system for biotechnology in the European Union is 
briefly sketched here. Prior to 2003, the competent 
authority in the EU member state where the product 
was to be released was responsible for assessing its 
safety and, if approved, notifying other member states, 
thus opening the way for marketing throughout the 
EU. EU-level intervention took place, however, if one 
member state disagreed with another’s decision. In 
2003, Regulation 1829/2003 EC established a “one-
door-one-key” approach. This approach comprises 
four steps (Christoforou, 2004; Wendler, 2005): 
1)  A company submits an application to a 
national authority, which passes on the 
application to the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA). EFSA is responsible for 
assessing both the use of GMOs for food and 
feed, and for the deliberate release of GMOs 
into the environment, which is necessary for 
GM crop production (Earlier, two separate 
approval processes were required).  
2)  EFSA informs all EU member states and the 
public and establishes an Opinion within six 
months. EFSA may ask a national food safety 
authority to carry out a food safety or 
environmental risk assessment. EFSA also 
requires a method validation from the 
Community Reference Laboratory to verify 
whether the methods and samples fulfill the 
requirements of EU guidelines.  
3)  When EFSA has completed its Opinion, it is 
forwarded to the EU Commission, the 
member state and the applicant. The public 
has the right to comment within 30 days on 
the Opinion. The Commission may consult 
with the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies in developing 
a draft decision.  
4)  The Commission’s draft decision is submitted 
to the Standing Committee on Food Chain 
and Animal Health, in which the member 
states are represented. A decision is made 
there according to a regulatory committee 
procedure known as “comitology.” If the 
measures envisaged by the Commission are 
not in accordance with the Committee's 
opinion, the Commission must refer them to 
the Council. The European Parliament must 
be consulted on decisions to authorize the 
release of GMOs. The EU Council has the 
ultimate authority to approve GM products, 
but the Council gets involved only if there is 
disagreement in the Committee. The Council 
can decide with a qualified majority. If an 
authorization is granted, it is valid in the EU 
for ten years an can be renewed after this 
time.  
The Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal 
Health appears to be the major forum where 
negotiations with national administrations and 
stakeholders take place (Wendler, 2005). EFSA is also Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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engaging with stakeholders. Its Management Board 
represents bodies across the agro-food chain, including 
consumer organizations, and its Advisory Forum 
includes representatives of expert advisory or 
regulatory bodies of Member States. The Commission 
engages with stakeholders through the Advisory 
Group on Food Chain and Animal Health. While 
authorization of GM products has been delegated to 
the EU level, the EU has left the specification of the 
regulations concerning the co-existence between GM 
and non-GM crops, including liability, to the member 
states, based on the assumption that cost-efficient 
solutions may differ between countries (Fischler, 
2003). Labeling requirements, however, have been 
established at the regional level. 
Conceptual Framework 
This section presents a conceptual framework that 
derives insights for the design of a regional regulatory 
system from different theories of regulation. The 
section starts with an overview of the institutional 
design options on which policy-makers in West 
Africa—and other regions that want to establish a 
regional regulatory system—have to decide. The 
second sub-section discusses a set of criteria that 
policy-makers may wish to consider when comparing 
different options for regional regulatory system. The 
third subsection reviews different branches of 
economic theory to identify factors and trade-offs that 
influence the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of different regulatory design options. 
Options for Regional Regulatory Design 
Table 1 provides an overview of the institutional 
design options. An important question is obviously the 
scope that a regional system should have, both in 
terms of substantive areas that may be regulated at the 
regional level, and in terms of the regulatory activities 
associated with each area that may be carried out at the 
regional level. As the case of the EU shows, a region 
may decide to regulate approvals for field testing, 
commercial release, and labeling at the regional level, 
but leave regulatory decisions on co-existence 
regulations and liability at the national level. Likewise, 
regions may decide to delegate some regulatory 
activities, such as risk assessment to the regional level,  
while performing others, such as post-approval 
monitoring activities at the national level.  
A second design feature of a regional regulatory 
system is the institutional structure to be established. If 
a regulatory system is established within the 
framework of an existing regional organization, such 
as in the case of WEAMU, ECOWAS and the EU, the  
institutional structure of the regional organization 
provides important frame conditions for the 
institutional design of the regional regulatory system. 
Regulatory institutions that may be set up at the 
regional level include a regional regulatory agency, a 
regional regulatory committees, and regional advisory 
councils. In case of CILSS, a Regional Regulatory 
Committee was established. In the case of the EU, 
existing institutions (EFSA, Standing Committee on 
Food Chain and Animal Health) are used for 
biotechnology regulation. There is also a need to 
decide whether regulation should rely on national 
scientific capacities, as in case of the CILSS common 
pesticide regulation, or whether regional scientific 
organizations should be established. The EU relies on 
a combination of both.  
With regard to regulatory decision-making, the 
question is which level of autonomy from the public 
administration decision-making bodies should have. 
This question also arises at the national level. 
Australia, for example, uses the model of an 
Independent Regulator who is accountable to the 
Parliament. In the EU, by contrast, regulatory 
decisions are made by the public administration of the 
EU, i.e., the Commission, or—in case of 
disagreement—by a political body, the Council of 
Ministers. 
There is also a need to decide on the decision-mode of 
a regional body. Decisions could be binding on the 
member states without being ratified by the member 
states, as in case of the EU authorization for GMO 
products. Alternatively, they may require ratification 
at the national level, or they may have only advisory 
character. Making decisions binding without 
ratification at the country level may be more feasible 
in regional organizations that can make binding 
decisions in other areas. This is the case for WEAMU, 
but not for ECOWAS. The example of the CILSS 
pesticide regulation shows that even without a regional 
organization that has the authority to make binding 
decisions for member states, states can still decide to 
abide by the decisions of a regional committee they 
have set up. 
A design feature that has potentially far-reaching 
implications for the time needed to reach a regulatory 
decision is the nature of the decision-making rules to Birner and Linacre 
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be applied. WEAMU requires decision-making by 
consensus. A legal assessment would be necessary to 
determine whether WEAMU could use different 
decision-rules for the case of biotechnology regulation. 
In ECOWAS, decisions are either made by consensus 
or with two third majority, depending on the subject. 
In the EU, the Council can make regulatory decisions 
with a qualified majority, as indicated above.  
A question regarding regulatory decision-making that 
is controversially discussed at the international level is 
what is to be considered in regulatory decision-
making. While there is an agreement that 
environmental and health risks should be considered, 
there is less agreement on the extent to which socio-
economic considerations and ethical concerns should 
be addressed as well in the regulatory process. Since 
the debate in West Africa focuses on the Cartagena 
Protocol and on Bt cotton, which is not a food crop, 
most of the attention has been paid to decision-making 
with regard to environmental risks, so far. One of the 
most debated issues in regulatory decision-making on 
biotechnology is the use of the precautionary principle. 
In the EU, which adopted the principle for 
biotechnology regulation, its interpretation in the 
regulatory process for biotechnology has remained 
debated (Levidow et al., 2007). Since the Cartagena 
Protocol and the African Model Law on Biosafety 
embrace the precautionary principle, it is an important 
issue in the debate on regional biotechnology 
regulation in West Africa. 
A further aspect of regulatory decision-making is the 
role of public participation, which may take different 
forms. The public can be granted the right to be 
informed and to submit opinions at various stages of 
the regulatory process. An early example of this 
approach is the US Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946, which requires that federal regulatory agencies 
provide for public participation by inviting written 
comments. Stakeholders may also be involved in a 
more institutionalized form, such as in advisory 
bodies. The EU uses both approaches. The CILSS 
Pesticide Convention has no provisions for public 
participation (Jaffe & Meissa Dieng, 2007). 
Participation has, however, been prominent in the 
UNEP-GEF assisted development of biosafety 
frameworks in West Africa. Participation mostly took 
the form of stakeholder participation in workshops 
(Resnick, 2006). The national biosafety draft laws in 
the WEAMU countries differ with regard to the type 
and degree of public participation in regulatory 
decision-making they provide for. Some countries plan 
to set up consultative committees that represent the 
public or stakeholders as part of their regulatory 
system (Birner et al., 2007). 
The division of responsibilities in risk management 
and risk assessment between the regulatory agency and 
the biotechnology industry is another question of 
institutional design. In most existing regulatory system 
for biotechnology, risk assessment studies have to be 
conducted by the industry, and are then reviewed by 
the regulatory agency. There is also a need to decide as 
to how far the industry is responsible for post-approval 
monitoring activities. 
The way in which a regional regulatory system should 
be financed is another important design question. A 
number of different mechanisms for financing 
regulatory systems exist, which can also be used in 
combination. They include a market levies; license and 
applications fees; tax revenues from the respective 
regional organization; direct contributions from 
member states (according to some formula); and donor 
funding.  
Criteria for Assessing Regulatory Design Options 
The standard literature on environmental policy 
instruments provides important criteria that can be 
applied to assess regulatory design options in a 
comparative perspective. The effectiveness in 
achieving the societal goals that regulation is supposed 
to achieve, in particular, ensuring a desired level of 
environmental and health safety is a crucial criterion, 
since this is the primary goal of biotechnology 
regulation. Hence, other criteria only become valid if 
this criterion is met. This effectiveness criterion is 
related to the “Public Interest Theory” of regulation 
(Viscusi, Harrington, & Vernon, 2007), which 
assumes that the primary goal of regulation is to 
correct market failures and address externalities.  
Economic theory adds a range of economic criteria. If 
one considers the benefits of regulation as difficult to 
quantify, cost-effectiveness is a useful criterion: Does 
the regulatory system achieve the desired levels of 
environmental and food safety levels at the lowest 
possible costs? If the benefits can be measured, one 
can conduct cost-benefit analyses and consider the 
“optimal intensity” of regulatory activity as a criterion. 
This intensity would be reached at the point where the 
marginal costs of regulation equal the marginal 
benefits. Another economic criterion highlighted in the Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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environmental policy literature is dynamic efficiency, 
which is related to the effects of the regulatory system 
on the long-term effects, such as the creation of 
incentives for innovation. 
Next to effectiveness and economic criteria, there is a 
range of criteria that can be considered as “good 
governance” criteria. These criteria can be derived 
from the literature on good governance. While the 
concept has remained subject to debate, the 
dimensions of good governance developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) have become 
widely accepted: voice and accountability; regulatory 
quality; government effectiveness; control of 
corruption; rule of law; and political stability. Except 
for the last criterion, which applies to the country level 
as a whole, all other criteria can be applied to 
biotechnology regulation, as discussed in the 
following. 
The government effectiveness criterion is linked to 
effectiveness criterion and the economic criteria 
already discussed, hence it is not listed separately in 
Table 2. An important aspect of regulatory quality can 
be seen in minimizing special interest capture in 
regulation. This problem was highlighted in a seminal 
paper by Stigler (1971), which laid the foundation for 
the “Capture Theory of Regulation”. The main 
a r g u m e n t  o f  t h i s  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  f i r m s  h a v e  a  s t r o n g  
interest in extracting rents from regulation, especially 
since regulation can restrict the entry of new firms, 
while voters do not have sufficient political incentives 
to prevent this type of rent-seeking. The literature on 
agricultural biotechnology regulation in developing 
countries appears to have focused on a different 
version of the capture theory of regulation, arguing 
that biotechnology regulation has been captured by 
environmental groups (Paarlberg, 2001) or by the 
pesticide industry (Graff & Zilberman, 2004). Good 
governance in biotechnology regulation would 
obviously imply to achieve a balance in societal 
interests and avoid capture by any special interest 
group. The challenges associated with this criterion are 
further discussed below.  
Avoiding special interest capture is related to another 
aspect of regulatory quality: the capacity of the 
process to balance the interests, values and risks 
attitudes of different groups of society in the 
regulatory process, so that the outcome of the process 
is considered to be fair. This criterion is linked to the 
voice and accountability criterion. Applying this 
criterion to the regulation of biotechnology implies 
that regulatory processes should be transparent and 
provide scope for citizen participation and that 
regulatory agencies are accountable to citizens and 
their political representatives, such as parliaments. 
Another good governance criterion is control of 
corruption in biotechnology regulation. This includes 
avoiding the creation of incentives for corruption and 
introducing safeguards against corruption. Unlike 
special interest capture, corruption refers to illegal 
activities.  
Little attention has been paid in the literature on 
agricultural biotechnology regulation to this question, 
so far. As an indication that this problem is real, in 
January 2005, Monsanto paid a fine of 1.5 Million 
US$ for bribing an Indonesian official. The company 
admitted that one of its employees paid the senior 
official in a bid to avoid environmental impact studies 
being conducted on its cotton (BBC News, 2005). 
Strategies to reduce corruption may include increased 
transparency and public participation as well as 
improved audits and administrative or political 
oversight. 
Applying the rule of law criterion to biotechnology 
regulation implies that regulatory decisions should be 
monitored and enforced. Hence, it is important in 
regulatory decision-making and in the design of 
regulatory systems to take into account what can be 
monitored and enforced, and which capacity needs to 
be created for this purpose.  
A further set of criteria refers to the conformity of a 
regulatory system with the international obligations 
that a country has signed, such as the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, WTO, with the treaties of the 
regional communities a country is member of, such as 
WEAMU or ECOWAS. Moreover, the regulatory 
system needs to conform with the constitution of the  
respective country. Conformity with international 
good practice in biotechnology regulation may be 
considered as a criterion, as well.  
A final set of criteria, against which regulatory design 
options can be assessed, is the creation of legitimacy. 
To a large extent, legitimacy is created by fulfilling the 
other criteria discussed above. In the case of regional 
biotechnology regulation in the EU, several authors 
have distinguished “input legitimacy”, which refers to 
the regulatory process, and “output legitimacy”, which 
refers to the performance and the results of regulation. Birner and Linacre 
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Process criteria which can be seen either as goals in 
their own right, or as instrumental to achieve other 
goals, include transparency, participation, fairness and 
accountability. Performance criteria, which constitute 
output legitimacy include the problem-solving 
capacity of the regulatory system and the avoidance of 
regulatory failures (Skogstad, 2002; Wendler, 2005). 
Insights from the Literature 
This section reviews different branches of the 
economic literature on regulation to identify factors 
and trade-offs that policy-makers in West Africa and 
elsewhere may wish to consider when making 
decisions on the design options outlined in Table 1. 
The review concentrates on four major questions that 
can be derived from Table 1: What is the appropriate 
level to which different types of regulatory activities 
should be assigned? What is the appropriate level of 
autonomy/independence of regulatory institutions? 
What level and form of participation is appropriate? 
And what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
different ways of financing a regional regulatory 
system? The environmental and fiscal federalism 
literature discussed in Subsection 3.3.1 concentrates 
on the first question, while the New Institutional 
Economics literature presented in Subsection 3.3.2 can 
be applied to all questions. 
Environmental and Fiscal Federalism Literature 
The literature on environmental federalism highlights 
the nature of the environmental good and the level at 
which externalities occur as essential to determine the 
optimal level of government at which environmental 
regulation should take place (Oates, 2001; 2004). 
While developed with a focus on local versus national 
governments, the theory can be applied to the national 
versus supra-national level. This literature shows that 
federal and supra-national regulation is justified in 
case of pure public goods, such as greenhouse gas 
emissions, because the environmental quality in one 
location is a function of the emissions in all other 
locations. In case of local public goods without spill-
over effects, local regulation will be justified, if one 
assumes that local governments maximize their 
constituents’ welfare.  
In the case of local public goods with spill-over 
effects, it is more challenging to identify the 
appropriate level of regulation, since neither national 
regulation nor local regulation would be efficient in 
this case (Oates, 2001). In the absence of transaction 
costs and distributional concerns, bargaining across 
local jurisdictions would, according to the so-called 
Coase Theorem lead to efficient outcomes. However, 
this is obviously not a practical solution, since 
transaction costs matter, as Coase (1960) observed. 
Still, what this theoretical consideration shows is that 
in case of spill-over effects, “the efficient outcome will 
not in general take the form of uniform national 
standards for environmental quality. The efficient 
pattern of pollution control will generally imply 
different levels of environmental quality across 
jurisdictions” (Oates, 2001:5). A common concern in 
case of both local public goods and local spill-over 
effects is the problem that a “race to the bottom” 
regarding environmental standards may occur. This 
argument is debated, however, and there is a large 
literature that aims at identifying the conditions under 
which a “race to the bottom” will in fact occur 
(Wellisch, 2000).  
Applying this line of reasoning to the case of 
biotechnology, one has to distinguish different types of 
risks associated with the technology. Some risks, such 
as introducing an allergen into the food chain are 
potentially externalities at a global level, but they 
require the transboundary movement of GMOs—in 
this case GMO food exports—to occur at that level. 
Hence, they can be managed by controlling 
transboundary trade. Therefore, they provide only a 
rationale for supranational regulatory coordination in 
this regard. The Cartagena Protocol, which six of the 
eight WEAMU member states ratified, already has 
provisions for transboundary movements of GMOs. 
Other potential externalities, such as the creation of an 
invasive-species-type of problem, are most likely 
occur at the level of an ecological zone, if they occur 
If several countries share the same ecological zone and 
the externality cannot be managed by controlling 
transboundary trade of seeds, this externality would be 
a “national spill-over”, analogous to the “local spill-
over” in Oates’ theory referred to above. Applying the 
Oates (2001) argument, this problem would not 
necessarily provide an economic rationale for 
centralized regulation at the regional, but it would 
make regional coordination necessary. Spill-over 
effects also occur at the local level in form of gene 
flow to the fields of farmers who want to produce GM-
fee crops. This problem can be managed by co-
existence regulations. It has implications for surpra-
national regulation only in so far as farmers in border 
areas may be affected.  Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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The implications for regional regulation change, if one 
takes into consideration that countries may have 
limited ability to control transboundary movements of 
GMOs. This may happen, for example, if farmers 
exchange seeds across the border. While some 
respondents interviewed for the study mentioned this 
possibility, further data collection would be required to 
establish the relevance of this problem. If the control 
of transboundary movements of GMOs is a problem, 
this problem provides a stronger justification for the 
establishment of regional coordination in 
biotechnology regulation. The same reasoning applies, 
if countries want to establish a common market and, 
therefore, want to reduce controls on transboundary 
movements of goods. This is actually the case in the 
WEAMU and in the ECOWAS region. Likewise, the 
establishment of a common market in the EU has been 
a strong rationale to delegate environmental 
regulation, including biotechnology regulation, to the 
EU level.  
There is limited evidence available regarding the 
question of whether a “race to the bottom” (see above) 
regarding biotechnology regulation may occur across 
countries within the same region. Comparing 
biotechnology regulation in the EU and the USA, 
Bernauer (2003) analyzed whether political subunits 
within a federal system can, by unilaterally installing 
stricter or laxer regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology, push the stringency of a system-wide 
regulation up or down. He concluded that in the EU, a 
process of “ratcheting up” has taken place, whereas 
such an effect is absent in the USA. His analysis 
shows that this outcome depends on the degree of 
centralization and autonomy of the federal regulatory 
system, and the political economy of interest group 
politics within the system. Oates (2001) finds that 
federal (centralized) environmental regulation in the 
United States for local public goods with spill-over 
effects has resulted in stronger environmental 
regulation than would be justified on efficiency 
grounds. 
The fiscal federalism literature, which precedes the 
environmental federalism literature, provides 
additional insights (see Weingast, 2007 for a review). 
One factor highlighted in this literature, in addition to 
economies of scale and spill-overs, is the role of 
differences in local preferences. Heterogeneity of 
preferences provides a rationale for decentralization. 
Applied to the question of regional biotechnology 
regulation, this argument suggests that the transfer of 
regulatory authority to a supra-national body is less 
justified if there are strong national differences in 
people’s preferences regarding biotechnology. To 
which extent such differences exist is an empirical 
question. There were differences across the WEAMU 
countries in the positions of the farmers’ organizations 
and civil society organizations interviewed for this 
study regarding Bt cotton. This may partly be linked to 
the fact that the political systems in the WEAMU 
region differ with regard to the scope they provide for 
independent civil society organizations to emerge and 
formulate their positions. Stakeholder information is 
not necessarily representative for the population as a 
whole. Including a set of biotechnology questions into 
representative surveys, such as the Afrobarometer 
survey, would provide valuable representative 
information on public opinions and on the opinions of 
different groups (farmers, consumers) regarding 
biotechnology.  
Table  53 summarizes some major insights derived 
from the environmental and fiscal federalism literature 
and the implications derived for biotechnology 
regulation. The major conclusion is that this literature 
suggests a need for regional coordination, but it does 
not in itself provide a rationale for centralized 
decision-making on biotechnology regulation. The 
literature draws attention to the fact that centralized 
decision-making may lead to regulatory standards that 
are, from an efficiency perspective, either too high or 
too low, especially if national preferences with regard 
to the environment and the technology differ. This 
disadvantage has to be weighed against the costs of 
controlling the cross-border movement of GMOs, 
which can be reduced through a centralized regulatory 
system. 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) Literature 
The NIE perspective helps to identify additional 
factors that influence the comparative advantage of 
different regulatory design options. According to 
Williamson’s (1991) “discriminating alignment 
hypothesis,” transactions that differ in their attributes 
are to be aligned with governance structures that differ 
in their costs and competence, so as to effect an 
economizing result. The term “governance structures” 
refers to different options for the institutional design of 
a regulatory system. To apply this approach to 
biotechnology regulation, one needs to (1) 
disaggregate or “unbundle” biotechnology regulation 
into different regulatory activities or transactions; (2) Birner and Linacre 
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identify the types of costs associated with different 
transactions; and (3) identify the attributes and 
context-specific factors that influence the costs arising 
under different governance structures. These steps are 
outlined in the following sections. 
Types of costs and benefits of different regulatory 
transactions 
Table 4 specifies major transactions involved in 
biotechnology regulation and lists the types of costs 
and benefits that are associated with each of these 
transactions. If more areas of regulation are 
considered, e.g., by including property rights, labeling 
and seed certification, additional regulatory 
transactions would need to be included in the table. 
For reasons of scope, this section discusses only the 
transaction listed in Table 4. However, the 
considerations presented in this section can be applied 
to other regulatory transactions.  
For each of the activities, the question arises under 
which governance structure (level at which regulation 
takes place; degree of autonomy; role of industry and 
civil society) it should be organized. To determine the 
comparative advantage of different governance 
structures, one needs to identify the factors that affect 
the costs and benefits that arise under different 
governance structures. In the case of regulation, it is 
mainly a matter of definition as to which costs should 
be considered as “transaction costs” and which types 
of costs should be considered as other costs. One may 
consider all costs related to regulation as transaction 
costs. In the following, we use the term “regulatory 
costs” for the sum of all costs that arise for carrying 
out a specific regulatory transaction.  
Table 4 also specifies who will incur different costs, 
not taking into account that—depending on the market 
structure—the industry may be able to pass on the 
costs to the farmers, who may be able to pass them on 
to consumers. In case of the benefits, it is less 
straightforward to determine how they will be 
distributed, since this depends not only on the market 
structure, but also on indirect effects. For example, if 
the regulatory system performs well in terms of risk 
management, the general public benefits directly, but 
the industry may also benefit indirectly if this leads to 
increased trust in the technology. 
As indicated above, one can, in principle, determine 
the “optimal intensity” for each regulatory transaction 
as the level where the marginal social regulatory costs 
equal the marginal social benefits. Existing studies 
have quantified absolute regulatory costs, for example 
in India (Pray, Bengali and Ramaswami, 2005). 
However, there is still little empirical information 
available to date on the marginal costs of regulation 
and on the absolute and marginal benefits of 
regulation. The benefits consist to a large extent in the 
reduction of health, environmental and agronomic 
risks.  
The potential benefits of regulation can be rather high, 
if one considers the costs that would arise if an 
allergen is introduced in the food chain or an invasive 
species-type of environmental problem or an 
agronomic resistance problem is created. The 
STARLINK case, even though it did not introduce an 
allergen into the food chain according to available 
evidence, is nevertheless an indication of the 
magnitude of the costs that could arise in such a case. 
Other benefits of regulation specified in Table 5, such 
as creation of legitimacy and trust in regulation are 
rather difficult to quantify as well.  
Acknowledging the empirical challenges of collecting 
empirical information on the marginal costs and 
benefits of regulation, the following sections apply a 
cost-effectiveness perspective to compare different 
governance structures and derive hypotheses regarding 
the factors that influence the comparative advantages 
of different governance structures. The approach used 
is in line with the standard literature of transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1991) 
Accordingly, the paper develops hypotheses on the 
absolute costs incurred for performing a regulatory 
transaction in a way that ensures a defined outcome. If 
this outcome is not achieved under a certain 
governance structure, one could add the benefits 
forgone as an additional category of costs.  
Level of centralization / decentralization 
Figure 2 illustrates the application of the transaction 
cost approach to the question at which level of 
government regulatory transactions should be carried 
out. The figure shows hypothetical cost curves for the 
regulatory activity under a more decentralized 
(national) governance structure x and a more 
centralized (supra-national) governance structure y. 
The vertical axis indicates the regulatory costs arising 
for the respective transaction. The horizontal axis 
displays the attributes, which increase the comparative 
advantage for centralized regulation.   Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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As can be derived from the regulatory federalism 
literature discussed above, spill-over effects and global 
public good characteristics are important attributes. 
Economies of scale in performing the respective 
activity are obviously another important attribute. For 
example, there are potentially large economies of scale 
in centralizing risk assessment for environmental 
safety, if several countries share an ecosystem with 
rather similar ecological conditions. In contrast, there 
fewer economies of scale in post-approval monitoring 
activities. The economies of scale in regulatory 
activities are linked to their “transaction intensity” 
(Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004). Transactions may be 
intensive in terms of frequency and in terms of spatial 
dispersion. Enforcing refuge requirements, for 
example, is far more transaction-intensive in terms of 
frequency and spatial dispersion than making 
decisions on the approval of field trial or commercial 
release applications. The more important these 
attributes are—indicated by a move to the right on the 
horizontal axis—the faster is the increase in the 
hypothetical costs for performing the respective 
activity under the decentralized (national) governance 
structure x.  
In case of a centralized (supra-national) governance 
structure y, the regulatory costs increase less rapidly, 
which is indicated by a smaller slope of the respective 
hypothetical cost curve. If the respective attributes are 
not relevant (moving to the left-hand side on the 
horizontal axis), a decentralized (national) governance 
structure has a comparative advantage over the 
centralized governance structure. From point a1 
onwards, a centralized governance structure has a 
comparative advantage over a decentralized 
governance structure for performing the respective 
regulatory transaction. For a < a1,  the decentralized 
governance structure has a comparative advantage.  
Figure 2 also displays the effect of context-specific 
factors. For example, if the capacity of a supranational 
regulatory agency is increased, it will, ceteris paribus, 
be able to perform the same regulatory activity at 
lower costs, for example, because the opportunity 
costs caused by delays in decision-making are 
reduced. This is indicated by a downward shift of the 
respective hypothetical cost curve in Figure 2. 
Accordingly, the point from which onwards a 
centralized organization of the respective transaction 
has a comparative advantage over a decentralized one 
moves from a1 to a2. The same effect may occur if the 
respective regulatory activity can be carried out, at 
least partly, through an already existing supranational 
governance structure, which reduces the transaction 
costs required for setting up a new supranational 
system for all aspects of regulation. In the case of 
West Africa, countries can partly rely on the already 
existing governance structures of CILSS, WEAMU 
and ECOWAS for biotechnology regulation, even 
though there is a need to build subject-matter specific 
capacity. 
The role of heterogeneous local (national) conditions 
and preferences, which has been discussed above, can 
also be considered in Figure 2 as a context-specific 
factor. In this case, a decentralized agency would be 
able to perform the respective activity at lower costs. 
This is indicated by a downward shift of the 
hypothetical cost curve that indicates decentralized 
regulation. Accordingly, the point from which 
decentralized regulation is more efficient moves to a3. 
A similar effect occurs, if local knowledge, rather than 
scientific knowledge, is required to perform a 
regulatory activity well. For example, local knowledge 
is important for the monitoring of refuge requirements, 
while scientific knowledge is important for 
environmental risk assessment activities. 
Table 5 summarizes the attributes of the different 
transactions derived from this discussion. The table 
provides a rationale for assigning pre-approval 
activities (risk assessment) to a supra-national level to 
make use of economies of scale and scarce scientific 
knowledge. In case of environmental risk assessment, 
a rationale for delegation to a supra-national body 
exists in particular, if countries share the same agro-
ecological zones. If the agro-ecology is very diverse, 
supra-national bodies may be less suited to be 
responsible for environmental risk assessment 
activities. The table suggests that there is also a 
rationale to assign post-approval (monitoring and 
evaluation) activities to a national or sub-national 
level, since such transaction-intensive activities are 
difficult to control from a supra-national level. In case 
of decision-making activities—approval of field trials 
and commercial release—the case is less clear, since 
these steps in the regulatory process are most 
contested politically. Therefore, other criteria, such as 
creating legitimacy need to be considered, as further 
discussed below. 
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The transaction cost framework can also be applied to 
the second aspect of a regulatory governance structure 
mentioned above: the degree of independence or 
autonomy that the regulatory agency has in performing 
a regulatory transaction. As in case of the level of 
regulation discussed above, the transaction cost 
framework requires the identification of the attributes 
of regulatory transactions that are relevant in this 
respect. The literature on political transaction costs 
and delegation (Dixit, 1996; Calvert, McCubbins, & 
Weingast, 1989) provides important insights in this 
regard. This literature suggests that delegation of 
authority from the political realm to an independent 
agency can reduce problems of “political interest 
capture”, which arise, for example, if there is a strong 
trade-off between short-term and long-term interests. 
Creating independent central banks is a well-known 
example. In Figure 3, the attribute “scope for political 
interest capture” is displayed at the horizontal axis. 
From point a1 onwards, an independent regulatory 
agency can perform the respective regulatory 
transaction at lower costs than the public 
administration, because in this cost-effectiveness 
consideration, the benefits of reduced political interest 
capture translate in a less steep increase in the 
respective hypothetical cost curve.  
For a < a1, however, an independent regulatory agency 
does not have a comparative advantage, because 
delegation also involves costs. These costs have been 
attributed to “legitimacy drift” and “delegatee drift” 
(Voigt & Salzberger, 2002). Legitimacy drift occurs if 
the public does not attribute the same legitimacy to the 
independent agency that they would attribute to a 
governance structure that involves less delegation. In 
the case of biotechnology regulation, the question of 
legitimacy is rather important, since the technology is 
politically contested. Delegatee drift occurs if the 
independent agency pursues goals other than those that 
the policy-makers had in mind when creating the 
agency. Delegation may also lead to increased 
coordination costs and reduced possibilities for 
monitoring. 
With regard to delegatee drift, the question arises as to 
whether an independent agency or the executive/public 
administration is likely to be subject to interest group 
capture, either by the industry or by environmental 
groups. In both cases, increased transparency and 
accountability can reduce the scope for this problem, 
resulting in a downward shift of the respective cost 
curve. In Figure 3, this option is indicated for the case 
of the public administration, but it would apply equally 
for the independent agency. It is an empirical question 
whether improved transparency and accountability can 
more easily be established in the respective public 
administration or in an independent regulatory agency. 
This question may depend on the level—national or 
regional—at which the regulatory activity is 
performed. 
An important issue related to the independence of the 
regulatory agency is its influence on the duration of 
regulatory decision-making processes. Delegating 
decision-making authority to the public administration 
or to an independent regulatory agency may have the 
advantage of reducing the time required for decision-
making by reducing the scope for politically motivated 
“blockages”, which may occur especially if a 
consensus rule is applied. The concepts of legitimacy 
drift and delegate drift draw attention to the trade-offs 
involved in using delegation as a strategy to deal with 
this problem. An alternative strategy is the 
specification of time periods for each step of the 
regulatory process, as in case of the EU regulatory 
system. The EU regulation delegates the authority to 
approve applications the Commission (i.e., the public 
administration), if the Council of Ministers (i.e., the 
political body) fails to come to act on them within 
three months (Christoforou, 2004). 
Role of participation in decision-making 
In addition to the questions of centralization and 
autonomy, the role that the private sector and civil 
society should play in biotechnology regulation is an 
important dimension of regional regulatory design 
(Table 1). The question of stakeholder and public 
participation is particularly relevant for decision-
making, but the public may also be involved in other 
regulatory activities, such as post-approval monitoring.  
Participation in regulatory decision-making can be 
considered as a goal in its own right and as an 
instrument to reach other goals, such as reducing 
conflicts by creating legitimacy. Regulatory systems 
differ considerably with regard to the role of 
participation, as this question is linked to the wider 
“regulatory culture” that a country has developed. If 
participation is seen from an instrumental perspective, 
transaction cost economics can be used to analyze the 
trade-off between increased transaction costs of 
decision-making caused by participation, and the 
benefits achieved by participation. The transaction 
costs of participation include the resources needed to Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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organize participatory processes, the opportunity costs 
of time of the participants, and the opportunity costs 
that are incurred if the time for passing regulatory 
decisions is increased, so that the technology becomes 
available later than otherwise. Participation may, 
however, also speed up decision-making by creating 
legitimacy and providing a formal forum for 
interaction. Other benefits of participation may include 
reduced enforcement costs due to the creation of 
legitimacy (cf. Birner & Wittmer, 2004; Mburu & 
Birner, 2002).  
The public choice literature provides additional 
insights, since identifying appropriate decision-making 
structures in view of conflicting values and interests 
has been a central topic in this literature. As shown by 
Arrow (1950), there is no procedure that makes it 
possible to aggregate individual interests to a social 
welfare function, if some basic principles such as the 
absence of a dictator are met. A classical approach to 
solve this problem, which is consistent with the 
framework suggested here, has been developed by 
Buchanan & Tullock (1962). The authors distinguish 
costs of decision-making and “external costs”, which 
arise if collective decisions negatively affect the 
interests of the individual. According to Buchanan & 
Tullock, these “external costs” can be avoided if the 
unanimity rule in decision-making is used, which 
implies that all individuals have to participate in 
decision-making and to consent. However, as this rule 
increases the costs of decision-making, the decision-
rule that is optimal from the individual’s point of view 
depends on the trade-off between the costs of decision-
making and the external costs for the decision under 
consideration.  
There is a considerable body of constitutional 
economics literature dealing with the efficiency of 
different collective choice rules based on this approach 
(Mueller, 2003). This literature could inform the 
design of decision-rules to be adopted in regional 
biotechnology regulation. If the number of countries is 
small, as in case of WEAMU, a consensus rule might 
be most appropriate for important decisions, such as 
approval of field trials and commercial releases. While 
consensus rules increase the legitimacy of the 
decisions made, they entail, however, the problem that 
one or more countries may block a decision, as 
discussed above.  
If decision-making on biotechnology regulation is 
transferred to a regional regulatory body, this has 
important implications for the possibilities of 
participation. On the one hand, transaction costs 
arising for participation in decision-making may be 
reduced if regulatory decisions are made by a supra-
national body and participation takes place at that 
level, resulting in a lower number of participatory 
processes to be organized. On the other hand, the 
possibilities to create legitimacy by participation at 
that level are more limited. Stakeholder organizations 
would need to be organized at the level where 
decision-making takes place, and they would need to 
have mechanisms that make them accountable to their 
membership across national boundaries. In the case of 
West Africa, the farmers are in fact organized at the 
WEAMU level through the umbrella organization 
ROPPA (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de 
Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 
Network of Peasant Organizations and Agricultural 
Producers of West Africa). Consumer and industry 
organizations do not have a formal umbrella 
organization at the WEAMU level, but according to 
the interviews conducted, they also collaborate at the 
regional level. In spite of the options created by such 
regional organizations of stakeholders, is unclear to 
which extent their participation in a regional system 
may create legitimacy at the national level, if no 
participatory processes at the national level take place, 
as well. 
If participation is seen as a goal in its own rights rather 
than just as an instrument to reach other goals, it is 
useful to combine the efficiency considerations of the 
NIE and the public choice literature with other 
approaches. The concept of “volitional pragmatism” 
developed by Bromley (2006) on the basis of classical 
institutional economics offers important insights. This 
approach holds that public policy decisions should be 
based on reasons that citizens can accept as a basis for 
political action. Scientific findings provide an 
important basis for making such decisions, but 
according to the volitional pragmatism perspective, the 
public needs to have the opportunity to judge scientific 
assertions in terms of reasons that matter to them. As 
Bromley (2006: 165) puts it, “in democratic market 
economies, citizens retain the authority to decide if 
and when scientific assertions constitute valuable 
belief.” Along similar lines, the concept of deliberative 
democracy suggests that the deliberations that take 
place in participatory processes can play an important 
role in creating agreement on the reasons that people Birner and Linacre 
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can accept for public decisions (Fung & Wright, 
2001). 
According to these perspectives, it is important to 
establish forms of public participation that allow for 
meaningful deliberation. Whether and in which form 
such participation can be achieved at the regional level 
as compared to the national level is ultimately an 
empirical question. One can hypothesize that a 
minimum level of identification of citizens with a 
regional community is required to achieve this goal. 
To which extent people in West Africa consider 
themselves as members of a West African community, 
represented by ECOWAS or WEAMU, is an important 
empirical question. Including this information into a 
survey conducted in the region may provide important 
information. 
This question of participation is also linked to the need 
to identify a desirable balance between using the 
institutions of representative democracy, especially 
Parliaments, to provide voice and accountability vis-à-
vis using participatory approaches that may be 
classified as deliberative or direct democracy. In 
processes of regional integration, the development of 
institutions of representative democracy (regional 
parliaments) often lacks behind the process of 
economic integration, leaving a “democratic deficit.” 
This problem that has been widely discussed in the 
EU, as the powers of European Parliament evolved 
rather slowly. WEAMU and ECOWAS face similar 
challenges. As indicated above, the European 
Parliament has the right to be consulted on regulatory 
decisions regarding biotechnology. Since WEAMU 
has an Interparliamentary Committee, and ECOWAS 
has a regional parliament, regional regulatory design 
needs to take into consideration the role that these 
institutions could play in the regulatory process. 
Financing Regulatory Systems 
The literature on regulation is comparatively silent on 
the question as to how regulatory systems should best 
be financed. The fiscal federalism literature suggests 
that, in principle, revenues should be raised at that 
level of government at which the respective services 
are provided, but provisions need to be made to avoid 
regional imbalances (Wellisch, 2000).  
The NIE literature suggests that one needs to take into 
account the transaction costs involved in different 
types of financing a regulatory system, and the 
incentives created, e.g., for opportunistic behavior. 
Table 6 presents some general considerations on that 
basis, which would need to be substantiated by further 
research. The different financing mechanisms 
displayed in the Table separately may in practice be 
combined to balance potential negative effects. If 
application fees are used, the costs of regulation are  
incurred by the companies or research organizations 
that develop GMOs. If the regulatory system relies 
entirely on application fees, the fees might be rather 
high and create disincentives, especially for small 
companies and for public sector organizations. 
Companies may pass on the costs to farmers through 
seed pricing. This possibility depends on the structure 
of the seed industry. In the West African cotton case, 
the seed supply is in the hands of few vertically 
integrated cotton companies, and the bargaining power 
of the farmers is limited (USDA, 2006). Hence, the 
possibilities of passing on the regulatory costs to the 
farmers are high.  
To which extent the farmers can pass on additional 
costs to consumers depends on the market structure, as 
well. Farmers are typically price takers, and small 
countries are price takers in international markets, 
such as cotton. Hence, the possibilities of the farmers 
to pass on the costs to consumers are limited. 
Accordingly, the benefits that farmers receive from 
growing GM crops would need to be sufficient to 
cover the costs of regulation incurred by them. One 
advantage of using application fees is that transaction 
costs of administering application fees are low as 
compared to other options.  
For the WEAMU regional biosafety project, a market 
levy has been discussed as a mechanism to finance a 
regional regulatory system. If a general market levy is 
used, all farmers, including those that do not grow GM 
crops, incur the costs of regulation. Farmers who do 
not want to grow GM crops may not consider this to 
be a fair distribution of regulatory costs. If the levy is 
charged only for GM crops, the transaction costs of 
administering the levy are increased. The transaction 
costs of administering a market levy also depend on 
the market structure. In case of cotton and other export 
crops, charging a market levy is feasible, but in case of 
crops that are marketed locally, such as food crops, 
charging a market levy would involve rather high 
transaction costs. Linacre (2007) conducted a 
simulation analysis of financing the proposed 
WEAMU regional regulatory system through a market 
levy. The analysis showed that problems of financial Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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sustainability may arise, if adoption rates are low and 
the system relies only on a market levy collected for 
Bt cotton. If the collection of revenues through the 
levy is not sufficient to finance the system after the 
expected donor support ends, this financing 
mechanism may create incentives to approve  
commercial release without due process in order to 
bridge the financial gap.  
A regional regulatory system may also be financed or 
co-financed from the revenues of the regional 
economic organization under which it is established. 
Both WEAMU and ECOWAS raise regional revenues 
by taxing imports from non-member states. If these 
revenues are used to finance the regulatory systems, 
the costs are incurred by the producers and consumers 
of the imported goods, which may not be considered 
optimal. Moreover, the use of these funds for 
regulation competes with other uses. A regional 
system could also be financed by contributions from 
the member states, in which case the distribution of the 
costs depends on the ways in which the member states 
raise their public revenues and on the competing uses 
of the these revenues. A formula would need to be  
developed to decide on the shares that the member 
states should contribute. The benefits that the member 
states derive from growing the respective GM crop 
might be used as basis for such a formula. Financing a 
regional regulatory system through regional revenues 
or contributions from member states does not create 
any obvious disincentives for innovation.  
 
The transaction costs of using these two mechanisms 
will be comparatively low, if regional organizations 
already have systems in place to collect regional 
revenues and, respectively, contributions from member 
states. Donor funding can be considered as another 
financial mechanism. So far, donors have invested 
considerably in the establishment of regional 
regulatory systems in West Africa and they are 
planning to provide further funding (see above). With 
respect to financial sustainability, donor funds might 
best be used to cover the fixed costs of establishing a 
regulatory system. If they are used to cover running 
costs, it is important to establish mechanisms that 
cover the costs of the system at the time the donor 
funding ends. 
The distribution of the regulatory costs is also 
influenced by the distribution of responsibilities for 
risk assessment and risk management between the 
biotechnology industry and the regulatory agencies. If 
the biotechnology industry takes a major responsibility 
for risk assessment and risk management, the costs 
incurred by the regulatory agency will be reduced. In 
most existing regulatory systems, it is the 
responsibility of the applicant to conduct studies on  
risk assessment, which are reviewed as part of the 
regulator process. The interviews held in West Africa 
suggested that public sector representatives see a 
comparatively large role for the regulatory agencies 
with regard to risk assessment and management. This 
position may well be justified, especially if liability 
rules or the possibilities to enforce them are weak, thus 
limiting the incentives for risk assessment and 
management that the industry faces in 
countries/regions where liability rules are strong and 
enforceable. 
Rules for the transition to a regional system 
As indicated in Table 1, there is a need to establish 
rules for the transition to a regional system. In 
particular, the question arises whether or not 
authorizations for field trials or commercial releases 
that had been established in a member state before it 
entered a regional system should remain valid. In case 
of the EU, prior authorizations become invalid. When 
joining the EU, Romania, for example, had to 
withdraw the approval for Round-up Ready Soy, 
which was already in cultivation (Gullickson, 2006). A 
“grandfathering rule” can be used to avoid such 
situations. In the case of West Africa, this question is 
relevant since Burkina Faso has already authorized 
field trials with Bt cotton.   
When deciding on a grand-fathering rule, it is 
important to consider the incentives that such a rule 
creates. If the regulatory system at the regional system 
has stricter standards than a national system, a 
grandfathering rule may create incentives to push 
through approvals at the national level before a 
country enters a regional system. If the regulatory 
standards at the national and regional level are 
comparable, this problem is less relevant. However, 
other factors also need to be considered, too. If joining 
a regional system is associated with the free movement 
of GMOs in the respective region, an environmental 
risk assessment at the regional level may be necessary 
before applying a grandfathering rule.  Birner and Linacre 
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Regional Biotechnology Regulation– Which Way 
Forward? 
The analysis of regional regulatory design has shown 
that the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
different institutional options depend on an array of 
economic, ecological and social factors. Regarding 
some of these factors, the available information is 
limited in the case of West Africa. For example, in the 
absence of representative citizen surveys, it is unclear 
to which extent the preferences with regard to 
biotechnology differ among the potential member 
countries of a regional regulatory system. Likewise, 
there is limited information on the extent to which 
cross-border movements of GMOs can be controlled, 
and at what costs, and on the nature of possible 
disruptions to a common market that such controls 
would cause. With regard to environmental effects, it 
would be useful to take into account that the system to 
be set up should be able to handle future applications 
for different types of crops. Hence, the spatial nature 
of possible environmental risks needs to be considered 
for the design of a regional regulatory system, even if 
such risks are not relevant for Bt cotton, which 
dominates the current debate on regional regulation. If 
agronomic or environmental risks lead to spill-over 
effects across country borders, the rationale for a 
regional approach to regulation is more pronounced 
than if this is not the case.  
With regard to the good governance criteria for 
assessing regulatory systems, there is also a range of 
open questions. Will it be easier to guarantee 
transparency, to avoid special interest capture, and to 
control for corruption at the national or at the regional 
level? Can meaningful public participation and 
deliberation be achieved at the regional level? Under 
what conditions will regulatory decisions at the 
regional level be considered legitimate? How much 
trust does the public have in regional organizations? 
Will a consensus rule for decision-making at the 
regional level, which may enhance legitimacy, lead to 
a blockage of regulatory decisions? Is involving of 
regional parliamentary bodies an appropriate way to 
increase voice and accountability? Or are other forms 
of participation more effective? With regard to the 
financing of a regional system, there are open 
questions and trade-offs as well. Which distribution of 
regulatory costs will be considered as fair, while at the 
same time creating incentives for innovation?   
The theoretical considerations presented in this paper 
can inform the debate on these questions. More 
empirical research, for example on the spatial 
dimension of possible risks, and on public perceptions, 
can also improve the basis for decision-making on 
regional regulatory design. To a large extent, however, 
the knowledge of local experts, stakeholders and 
policy-makers will be key to finding answers to these 
questions. The organizations that have promoted the 
establishment of a regional regulatory system in West 
Africa have all placed strong emphasis on 
participation, mostly by organizing workshops with 
stakeholders. The analysis presented in this paper 
suggests that it would be useful to find ways of 
bringing the knowledge of experts, stakeholders and 
policy-makers in the region to bear—in a structured 
way—on the specific questions of regional regulatory 
design identified here. The analysis also shows that 
there is merit in paying attention to the details of a 
regional regulatory system by unbundling regulation 
into different activities and by reflecting on the 
appropriate level of organization for each regulatory 
activity.  
Involving stakeholders in such kinds of debate may 
require forms of interaction other than those typically 
practiced at stakeholder workshops (such as 
presentations followed by general discussions). There 
is a wide range of participatory techniques that have 
been developed in the context of technology impact 
assessments, which could be applied in processes of 
establishing regional regulatory systems. Combining 
participation with multi-criteria analysis appears to be 
a particularly promising approach, because regional 
regulatory systems have to be evaluated against 
multiple criteria (Table 2), and stakeholders may 
assign different weights to different criteria. The 
experience with the use of multi-criteria analysis in 
participatory processes has shown that this often helps 
to rationalize emotional debates, and to narrow down 
the number of options on which different groups 
disagree (Rauschmayer & Wittmer, 2006).  
Ultimately, the process of establishing a regional 
regulatory system is a political process. The way in 
which decision-making will be organized at the 
regional level, and the way in which the expected costs 
and benefits of a regional system are distributed, have 
important implications for the political economy of 
establishing such a system. Different interest groups 
may promote or oppose the process, depending on the 
way in which they envisage a regional system to work. Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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In the West African case, the interviewed groups that 
were critical of biotechnology were also critical of the 
establishment of a regional regulatory system, as they 
were concerned that such a regional system may be 
used to “impose” GM crops on countries where 
resistance against biotechnology is strong. Groups that 
were in favor of biotechnology were in general also in 
favor of establishing a regional regulatory system, 
highlighting potential efficiency gains. Since political 
disagreement about biotechnology has led to the delay 
of establishing national systems for biotechnology 
regulation in several countries of the region, it is 
unclear whether the goal of establishing a regional 
regulatory system will speed up or further slow down 
the creation of a legal basis for the introduction of 
biotechnology in the region. Likewise, it will depend 
on the design of the system and on political economy 
factors that influence its operation as to whether 
regional regulation will ultimately lead to a more or a 
less precautionary approach towards biotechnology in 
the region. An analysis of the political economy of 
biotechnology regulation in West Africa was beyond 
the scope of this paper, but this is certainly an 
important field of research relevant to the 
establishment of regional regulatory systems. While 
West Africa and the EU have been used as empirical 
cases in this paper, the analytical framework presented 
in Section 3 is equally relevant for other regions of the 
world that are engaged in establishing a regional 
regulatory system for biotechnology. A dialogue and 
the sharing of experience among experts and 
stakeholders from different such regions might provide 
further fruitful insights on regional regulatory design. 
Hopefully, this paper can contribute to such dialogues 
and thus help citizens in different regions of the world 
to promote good governance in the regulation of this 
important and contested technology. 
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Table 4: Options for Regional Regulatory Design 
Decision points   Options  
1) Scope of a regional system 
Substantive areas that can be regulated at 
regional level 
Approvals for  
field trial applications and contained use 
commercial releases 
food and feed use 
Liability and co-existence regulations 
Labeling requirements 
Intellectual property rights 
Types of regulatory activities that can be 
performed regional level 
Standard-setting for and review of national pre- and post-approval activities 
Pre-approval risk assessments  
Approval decisions (see above) 
Post-approval monitoring, compliance and enforcement activities 
Enforcement of transboundary transport regulations 
2) Institutional structure of a regional system 
Type of institutions to be established  Regional authority with our without abolishment of national authorities 
Regional advisory bodies, committees 
Use of existing institutions or creation of specific institutions 
Level of independence/autonomy  
Scientific  capacity  Regional scientific institutions established or denominated versus reliance on 
national institutions  
3) Decision-making at the regional level 
Mode of decision-making  Political or administrative decision-making 
Binding without ratification at country level (=self-executing) vs. binding after 
ratification vs. advisory 
Consensus versus majority rules  
Degree and form of public participation in 
decision-making at different levels 
Compulsory versus voluntary 
Advisory councils, written comments, stakeholder meetings, public hearings, 
surveys 
Issues considered in decision-making   Environmental and health risks – level of precaution 
Socio-economic considerations 
Ethical issues 
4) Financing of a regional system  
Mode of financing the system  Revenues from regional organization or member states  
Application and license fees 
Market levies 
5) Distribution of responsibilities between regulatory agency and industry 
Distribution of responsibilities  Different  degree  of  responsibility of the industry for risk assessment and 
management 
6) Transition to regional system 
Mode of dealing with existing national 
regulations 
“Grandfathering rules” 
Discontinuation of existing rules 
Source: Adapted from (Birner & Linacre, 2007) Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 























Effective in ensuring desired levels of environmental and food safety;  
Avoidance of regulatory failures 
Economic 
criteria 
Cost-effectiveness: Achieving desired levels of environmental and food safety at lowest possible costs 
Optimal “intensity” of regulation: Expected marginal benefits from regulation equal expected marginal 
costs 





Control of special interest capture: Regulation is not captured by special interest groups (biotechnology 
industry; environmental groups) 
Fairness: Acceptable balance of different societal interests; acceptable distribution of costs and benefits. 
Voice and accountability: Processes are transparent and provide scope for citizen participation; regulatory 
agencies are accountable to citizens and their political representatives; 
Control of corruption: Regulation does not create incentives for corruption / has safeguards against 
corruption  
Rule of law: Regulations can be enforced. 
Conformity 
criteria 
Regulation conforms with international agreements (Cartagena Protocol; WTO) 
Regulation conforms with regional treaties and national constitutions 
Regulation conforms with international good practice standards 
Legitimacy 
criteria 
Input legitimacy: Regulatory process is considered as fair, transparent, participatory and accountable. 
Output legitimacy: Performance of regulatory process is considered satisfactory; avoidance of regulatory 
failures; problem-solving capacity. 
Table 6: Types of risks and implications for regulatory design 
Type  of  risk  Level at which 




Implications for regulatory design 
Food safety risks 
(e.g., allergens, 
toxins) 
National and all 
countries to GM food 
products are exported 
Risk attitudes of 
consumers may vary 
across countries 
Need for regulation of transboundary 
movements 
Economies of scale in risk assessment for all 
countries where respective food is consumed 
Gene flow to other 
farmers’ fields 
Local; may affect 
border areas of 
neighboring countries 
Depending on 
economic interests in 
GMO-free production  
Need for co-existence /distance regulations; 
including for borders between countries 
Gene flow to wild 
species leading to 
agronomic problems 
and/or loss of 
biodiversity 
Ecosystem; may affect 
neighboring countries if 
they share the same 
ecosystems; may 
occur with or without 
cross-border trade 
Risk attitudes of 
farmers and general 
population and 
preferences for 
biodiversity may vary 
across countries 
Need for regulation of transboundary 
movement  
Need for cross-country coordination at 
ecosystem level 
Economies of scale in risk assessment at 
cross-country-level, if countries share the 
same agro-ecological zones Birner and Linacre 






Table 7: Types of costs and benefits of different regulatory transactions 
Regulatory transaction  Types of costs*  Types of benefits 
Risk assessment for food and 
environmental safety 
I: Costs incurred for conducting trials/studies 
A: Costs of assessing dossiers and conducting 
additional tests; costs incurred for ensuring 
compliance with field test regulations 
Avoiding health problems and environmental 
/ agronomic problems 
Building public trust in GM technology 
Agronomic / socioeconomic 
assessment 
As above  Reducing economic risks for farmers 
Decision-making on approval for 
contained and confined trials and for 
commercial release 
A: Costs incurred for negotiations; coordination 
among committees; organization of participatory 
processes 
I: Application fees 
I/C/P: Costs incurred for participating in decision-
making processes 
F/I: Income forgone in case of delay of approval 
Avoiding health problems and environmental 
/ agronomic problems 
Building public trust in GM technology 
Creating legitimacy for biotechnology 
regulation 
Post-approval monitoring and 
enforcement, e.g., of distance (co-
existence) regulations and refuge 
guidelines 
F: Costs incurred for compliance 
I: Costs incurred for monitoring 
A: Costs incurred for monitoring and enforcement 
Avoiding environmental problems 
Avoiding agronomic / resistance problems 
Control of transboundary 
movements of GMOs 
A: Costs incurred for border control 
I: Costs incurred for documentation 
Avoiding environmental / agronomic 
problems 
Raising revenues for regulation  A:  Costs  of raising revenues, e.g., administering 
market levies 
Fair / incentive-compatible distribution of 
regulatory costs  
Costs incurred by A: regulatory agency; I: biotechnology industry and public sector organizations developing GM crops; C: 
civil society organizations/stakeholders; F: farmers. 
Source: authors Designing Regional Regulation of Biotechnology Systems 
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Type of knowledge 
needed  
Food safety risk assessment  low  low  scientific 
Environmental risk assessment  depending on ecology  low  scientific 
Decision on field trial approval  low  low  scientific 
Decision on commercial release  low  low  scientific 
Monitoring of refuge and co-
existence regulations 
high medium  local 
Enforcement of transboundary 
transport regulation 
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Figure 4: Comparative efficiency of different governance structures   (1) Level of governance 
Source: Based on Williamson (1991) and Birner & Wittmer (2004) Birner and Linacre 
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Figure 5: Comparative efficiency of different governance structures    (2) Degree of autonomy 
Source: Based on Williamson (1991) and Birner & Wittmer (2006) 
Table 9: Implications of Different Ways to Finance a Regional Regulatory Syste 
Financial 
Mechanism* 
Distributional implications  Implications for incentives  Transaction costs of 




Costs initially incurred by 
applicant; in case of industry 
applicants, costs maybe passed 
on to farmers and then to 
consumers, depending on 
market structure 
Disincentives for innovation, 
especially for small enterprises and 
public sector research organizations 
Comparatively low 
Market levy  Costs incurred by all farmers or 
farmers growing GM crops, 
depending on the system used; 
costs maybe passed on to 
consumers, depending on 
market structure 
If levy applies only to GM crops, 
problems of financial sustainability 
may arise, depending on adoption 
rates; system may create incentives 
to approve commercial release 
without due process to bridge 
financial gaps 
Need for administration of the 
market levy; costs depend on 
market structure; potentially high, 
if marketing system is diverse/ 
fragmented and if levy is only 




Depends on the way in which 
regional revenues are raised 
(e.g., imports); competition with 
other uses of regional funds 
No obvious disincentives  Comparatively low, if regional 
system of revenue collection is 




Costs incurred by tax payers of 
member countries; cross-
country distribution depends on 
formula used; competition with 
other uses  
No obvious disincentives   Comparatively low, if system of 
national contributions to regional 
organization is already in place 
Donor funding  Costs incurred by tax payers in 
donor countries; competition 
with other uses 
Problems of financial sustainability 
may arise, if funding is not 
guaranteed 
Depending on the extent to which 
donors set up own financial 
procedures  
* Different financial mechanisms may be combined 